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Article 7

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
will accomplish the same result as was intended to be accomplished in the
instant case by the invalid gift. 2 Ind. L. J. 178 and authorities cited.
The decision of the instant case with the considerations here mentioned
would indicate that the case of Ogden v. Washington NationalBank, supra,
which can not be distinguished on its facts, is incorrect, which conclusion
vindicates the sharp criticism of that case in a former issue of this Journal.
J. B. E.
See 2 Ind. L. J. 178.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-PEAFABLE REENTRY-On October 26, 1926,
plaintiff and defendant, Jessewein, entered into a written contract whereby
defendant Jessewein sold to plaintiff all the sand and gravel that plaintiff
might remove from defendant Jessewein's land; the contract was for a
period of two years with an option for a third year. Plaintiff agreed to pay
12Y2 per yard for the gravel, payment to be made before -the 15th of
every month. Pursuant to the contract plaintiff removed gravel until January 1, 1927, but has removed none since that date. On January 1, 1927,
plaintiff owed defendant for 465 yards of gravel. He failed to pay on demand, and on February 10, 1928, defendant served plaintiff with the statutory notice to pay or quit the premises. Plaintiff failed to pay at the
expiration of the ten days, and defendant took peaceable possession of the
premises. On October 26, 1928, plaintiff attempted to exercise his option
for a third year, and now attempts to enjoin defendant Jessewein and defendant Snyder, to whom Jessewein has sold the gravel, from entering on
the premises, and from removing sand and gravel therefrom. Held, the
law is with the defendants. Calef v. Jessewein, Appellate Court of Indiana, June 4, 1931, 176 N. E. 632.
The lease was terminated at the expiration of the ten days notice, given
in accordance with Sec. 9543, Burns Annotated Statutes, 1926. Templer v.
Muncie Lodge, 50 Ind. App. 324, 97 N. E. 546 (1912). By the common law
the owner of real estate entitled to its possession, could oust the possessor
by force, and without the aid of legal procedure. 4 Black Con. 418. Hammond Saving & Trust Co. v. Boney, 61 Ind. App. 295 (1915). The English
rule, since 1920 (Hennings v. Stoke Pogues Golf Club (1920), 1 K. B. 720,
and the minority rule in this country is that the landlord may expel the
tenant, who has no right to possession, by force and without process, providing the landlord uses no more force than is reasonably necessary. Cases
collected in 36 C. J. 600 and 45 A. L. R. 313. But the majority rule, and
the doctrine to which Indiana adheres, is that the owner of land who is
wrongfully kept out of possession by another, may gain possession by
peacable means; but if the owner cannot gain possession peaceably, he must
seek the aid of legal procedure. Scott v. Willis, 122 Ind. 1 (1889). Hanmond Savings & Trust Co. v. Boney, supra. Cases cited in 45 A. L. R. 316.
Peaceable possession is possession obtained without force or show of violence. Scott v. Willis, supra. The majority rule is that after a peaceable
re-entry the landlord may protect his possession by such force as is reasonably necessary. Mugford v. Richardson, 6 Allen 76. Gillespie v. Beecher,
85 Mich 347, 48 N. W. 561. And cases cited in 45 A. L. R. 317, and in 16
R. C. L. 700. Although the latter point does not seem to have been before
the Indiana Courts, to be consistent they would have to adopt the same rule.
To recognize the landlord's right of peaceable re-entry, and yet to pro-
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hibit him from effecting a complete possession or from maintaining
his possession, would be equivalent to rendering nugatory his right of peaceful re-possession. Although the Indiana Courts have apparently not decided the point, the great weight of authority is that regardless of the fact
that the landlord made a peaceable re-entry, he is liable in damages if, by
his negligence, the tenant's chattels are damaged, or if by the use of excessive force the tenant or the members of his family are injured. See collection of cases in 45 A. L. R. 326; 36 C. J. 601; 16 R. C. L. 1180.
R. 0. E.
REAL PRoPERTY-FuTURE INTERESTS-RIGHTS OF UNBORN CHIn--On
January 23, 1869, Henry Pierce, owner of certain land, conveyed by a quit
claim deed (his wife joining therein) the land to his wife, Telitha Pierce, for
life, then to his daughter, Adeline Pierce, during her life, and then to her
children. At the time of the conveyance Adeline Pierce was unmarried and
without children, but she subsequently married with one Alvah Evans
and had born to her a son, George A. Evans. After a divorce Adeline
Evans was remarried to Frank G. Bearss and shortly afterwards brought
suit to quiet title to the land alleging a fee simple in herself. All living
parties having an interest in the land were made defendants in the action
including the infant son, George Evans, who upon defaulting was represented by a guardian ad litemr The circuit court decreed a fee simple title
in Adeline Bearss (n~e Pierce) and that same be forever quieted in her.
On May 9, 1892, some eleven years after the rendition of that decree,
Eva Bearss, the present appellant, was born to Adeline and Frank G.
Bearss. Eva Bearss brought an action alleging ownership in fee simple
of an undivided one-half interest in remainder, subject to her mother's
life estate and asked that title thereto be quieted in her. A demurrer to
the complaint was sustained and an appeal taken to the Supreme Court of
Indiana. Held, in accordance with the law as it existed at time of the
original conveyance and suit to quiet title a fee simple title vested in the
daughter and hence there could be no remainder over to any child of Adeline, then in existence or thereafter born. Bearss v. Corbett, Supreme Court
of Indiana, 177 N. E. 59.
The Supreme Court holding is summarized in the following quotation
from the opinion:
"Under the law as it exists in Indiana at the present time a grant to
A during her life, then to B during her life and then to her children gives
B (upon the death of A) a life estate, with a remainder over to her children after her death."
An investigation into the cited authority establishes beyond reasonable
doubt the truth and validity of that statement. Hackleman v. Hacklemran
(1925) 88 Ind. App. 204; Alsran v. Walters (1914) 184 Ind. 565; Burrell
v. Jean (1925) 196 Ind. 187; Coquillard v. Coquillard (1916) 62 Ind. App.
489. The rule deduced from a consideration of these and other authorities
is that if a testator or grantor, by unambiguous language, creates a contingent remainder, it is the duty of the courts to uphold it. It is clear that
in the instant case there is no ambiguity as the grant simply states "to my
daughter, Adeline Pierce, during her life and then to her children." The
only possible construction afforded by that language seems to be that B

